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Contrary to the practice of the majority of nations, the United
States has declined to assertjurisdiction over marine scientific research within its Exclusive Economic Zone. This paper will briefly
discuss the issue of whether the latitude granted marine researchers has resulted in significant damage to the fisheries resources of
the United States, and examine the informal procedures whereby
illegal fishing activity, under the guise of research, is minimized.

In establishing the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) of the United
States on March 10, 1983,1 President Reagan, in an accompanying
policy statement said:
While international law provides for a right of jurisdiction over marine scientific research within such a zone, the proclamation does not assert this
right. I have elected not to do so because of the United States interest in
encouraging marine scientific research and avoiding any unnecessary burdens. The United States will nevertheless recognize the right of other
coastal states to exercise jurisdiction over marine scientific research within
200 nautical miles of their coasts, if that jurisdiction is exercised reasonably
in a manner consistent with international law.2

This presidential action was fully in keeping with the precedent es* Office of Marine Science and Technology Affairs, U.S. Department of State.
The views expressed herein are solely those of the author, and do not necessarily reflect
those of the Department of State or the United States government.
1. Proclamation No. 5030, 48 Fed. Reg. 10,605 (1983), reprinted in 1983 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS A28. The Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) extends 200 nautical miles from the baseline from which the territorial sea is measured or, where the
proximity of neighboring states requires, in accordance with equitable principles. Id.
2. President's Statement on United States Oceans Policy, 19 WEEKLY COMP.
PREs. Doc. 383 (Mar. 10, 1983).
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tablished by the Magnuson Fishery Conservation and Management
Act (MFCMA) 3 which established the United States 200 nautical
fisheries, but which excluded jurisdiction over
mile jurisdiction over
4
fisheries research.
Declining to assert jurisdiction over marine scientific research
(MSR) beyond the limits long established by international law is in
accord with the approach of the United States in UNCLOS III,
which asserted that marine scientific research should be relatively
unrestricted. 5 The President's decision on MSR had the full support
of both the federal agencies responsible for the MSR and the
United States academic MSR community.7 Declining to assert jurisdiction over an activity 8 is also in line with the conservative approach
traditionally followed by the United States regarding offshore territory as well as with its restrained approach toward the exercise of
coastal state jurisdiction (permitted under customary
international
law as reflected by the 1982 LOS Convention). 9 Not asserting jurisdiction, or the full jurisdiction allowed, is fully consistent with customary international law and the Convention.
The policy of the United States of promoting, to the maximum
feasible extent, the freedom of MSR is based on the following principles: all persons benefit from increased knowledge of the ocean;
3. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1801-82 (1982).
4. See, e.g., Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, Apr. 29,
1958, 15 U.S.T. 1606, T.I.A.S. No. 5639, 516 U.N.T.S. 205 (The Convention does not
actually provide that research in territorial waters is subject to the coastal states' consent, but this proposition has long been observed); cf. United Nations Convention on the
Law of the Sea, opened for signature Dec. 10, 1982, 21 I.L.M. 1261, U.N. Doc. E.
83.V.5 (1983) (article 245 expressly provides that coastal states have the exclusive rights
to regulate and authorize marine scientific research in the territorial sea) [hereinafter
cited as UNCLOS III]. See also Convention on the Continental Shelf, Apr. 29, 1958, 15
U.S.T. 471, T.I.A.S. No. 5578, 499 U.N.T.S. 311 (article 5 requires that research of the
continental shelf requires the consent of the coastal state, which will not normally withhold it).
5. See, e.g., President's Statement on the Third United Nations Conference on
the Law of the Sea, 18 WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc. 94-95 (Jan. 29, 1982) (referring to
the world's oceans as "a frontier for expanding scientific research and knowledge."). See
also President's Statement, supra note 2, at 383 (encouraging "marine scientific research
and avoiding any unnecessary burdens.").
6. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Sept. 17, 1984, at B13, col. 3.
7. See, e.g., Vallarta, Protection and Preservation of the Marine Environment
and Marine Scientific Research at the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of
the Sea, 46 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 147, 153-54 (1983) (discussing the views of industrialized nations on legal regimes surrounding marine scientific research and the potential
difficulties faced by scientists in states not a party to UNCLOS III).
8. See generally UNCLOS III, supra note 4.
9. See Proclamation No. 5030, supra note 1, at 10, 605; President's Statement,
supra note 2, at 383 (indicative of the conservative approach of the United States towards exercising jurisdiction over the oceans). See also NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON OCEANS AND ATMOSPHERE, THE ExCLUSIvE ECONOMIC ZONE OF THE UNITED

STATES: SOME IMMEDIATE POLICY ISSUES (May 1984) (discussing the implications of
President Reagan's proclamation).
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MSR itself benefits from any increases in the data base; and, there is
so much to learn about the ocean, including from the waters off the
shores of the United States, that the more people engaged in research, the better.
This attitude is contrary to conventional wisdom, as reflected in
UNCLOS III10 and as practiced by the majority of other nations.
Conventional reasoning asserts that national jurisdiction over ocean
resources requires jurisdiction over research, as MSR might yield information pertaining to those resources, thereby creating a negotiating advantage regarding their access or exploitation. The position of
the United States is that, as long as the coastal state can control
actual exploitation, any forgone negotiating advantage is more than
offset by the benefits derived from increased knowledge.
One test of the policy of the United States is its experience with
the fisheries research exclusion of the MFCMA in the six years between its effective date in 1977 to the 1983 Reagan Proclamation
and, since the Proclamation. This is especially true because fisheries
research often involves the actual catching of fish, occasionally in
sizeable quantities, and the actual use at times of commercial fishing
vessels and/or gear. In contrast, other types of MSR involve primarily gathering data and information. When water or geological samples are taken, they are in limited quantities, and have little potential
for immediate commercial value. In the context of the fisheries research exclusion, has the United States effectively prevented commercial fishing from occurring under the guise of MSR?
To date, the freedom permitted fisheries research within the
United States' EEZ has posed no serious problem to overall national
interests, and has well served the policy of limited jurisdiction. This
success has been achieved despite the difficulty of precisely defining
MSR, 11 or even a specialized aspect thereof such as fisheries research, to distinguish it definitively from prospecting, exploration,
scouting, or in some cases actual exploitation. Although the United
States possesses the world's largest marine fisheries resources, its lenient stance has demonstrated that control over research is not necessary to effectively regulate fisheries. There is no evidence that national interests have been harmed in the negotiation of fisheries

10. See UNCLOS III, supra note 4, arts. 238-65 (providing for a more restrictive
approach to the conduct of MSR than evidenced by the position of the United States).
11. See 50 C.F.R. §§ 611.1-.17 (1984) (discussing the regulation of foreign fishing
vessels but failing to expressly define "scientific research" for exclusion purposes).

agreements,1 2 or in allocations discussions, due to knowledge gained
by other states from the latitude afforded fisheries research in the
EEZ of the United States.
The largest problem created is a practical one which confronts the
enforcement officer evaluating the activity of a foreign researcher in
the zone of the United States. The researcher may be using a vessel
which resembles or actually is a chartered fishing vessel. He may be
using commercial fishing gear, catching and perhaps keeping fish.
However, the researcher is not subject to United States jurisdiction
within the 200 mile limit,1 3 although, except in motivation, his activities may be identical to the commercial fisherman on the next vessel, who is fully subject to United States fisheries jurisdiction, operating under the dictates of the MFCMA. 4 The researcher is not
subject to United States jurisdiction; the fisherman is. The enforcement officer is on the horns of a dilemma if he cannot determine
whether the individual taking a fish is a researcher, completely
outside his authority, or a fisherman, who is fully subject to his police powers.
Because the researcher is outside its jurisdiction, the United States
cannot require prior certification of his research activity. Enforcement officers cannot board a foreign vessel conducting research, except by invitation, to verify the nature of activities. However, a foreign fishing vessel inside the zone can be boarded as a matter of
right, its gear, catch, and records inspected, and its occupants questioned, detained, or required to take certain actions to assist the inspection. In an extreme case the vessel can be seized and taken into
a United States port where penalties and fines may be levied.
Operationally, determining whether a vessel is engaged in research
has not posed significant problems. An informal but effective method
for verifying the bona fide nature of foreign fisheries research inside
the 200 mile limit has been devised, which informs enforcement officers of research activity before it has begun. In practice, this procedure covers virtually all such research in the zone. The volume of
research without prior clearance is too low to have any significant
impact on fishery resources.
12. The MFCMA requires that a Governing International Fishery Agreement
(GIFA) be concluded before foreigners are permitted to conduct commercial fishing in
the conservation zone of the United States (200 nautical miles). 16 U.S.C. § 1821(c)
(1982). After a GIFA is concluded, permits are issued for specific fishing vessels, and
fish allocations are established for the country involved. A GIFA is not required to conduct fisheries research as the activity is not included in the definition of "fishing." Id. at
§ 1802(10).
13. This statement assumes that there are no violations of the provisions surrounding research of the territorial seas and the continental shelf.
14. See generally Foreign Fishing and International Fishery Argument, 16 U.S.C.
§§ 1821-27 (1982).
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The researcher interested in working in the territorial waters of
the United States or on the fisheries resources of the continental
shelf must request formal clearance through diplomatic channels. In
discussions conducted between the passage of the MFCMA in 1976
and its implementation in 1977, concerned federal agencies and the
academic MSR community agreed any mechanism used to verify the
bona fide nature of fisheries research should be scientific, and thus as
far removed from formal channels as possible. 15 Accordingly, it was
decided the best approach would be to encourage foreign researchers
to submit proposed fisheries research programs directly to the appropriate Center Director of the National Marine Fisheries Service
(NMFS) for prior review (not clearance). These four officials, located in Woods Hole, Miami, La Jolla, and Seattle, are responsible
for the implementation of the domestic fisheries research program.
They review foreign proposals using the same criteria that are applied to domestic fisheries research projects. If not satisfied that a
proposal constitutes legitimate research, they may negotiate modifications with the foreign researcher until the criteria of the MFCMA
research exclusion are met. The local Coast Guard and NMFS enforcement officials are then informed that the foreign fisheries research is scheduled. Although it may appear that the foreign research is taking significant quantities of fish, the enforcement officer
will be on notice the activity is bona fide research, as the Center
Director has certified that it is necessary to achieve scientific objectives. Most fisheries research, of course, utilizes only a limited quantity of fish for scientific studies. If the Center Director is not assured
that the proposal constitutes bona fide research, he must inform the
foreign researcher and enforcement agencies that he considers the
activity to be "fishing" within the meaning of the Act. If the foreigner wishes to continue with the project under these circumstances,
he must obtain a MFCMA permit and follow allocation procedures,
or be in violation of United States law.
Virtually all foreign fisheries research off the shores of the United
States is conducted in cooperation with the United States, usually
the NMFS. Thus, the United States is satisfied in advance that foreign fisheries research is legitimate. However, under the MFCMA, a
foreign researcher is free to perform research without first contacting
the NMFS. The occurrence and frequency of such research is proba15. The author was personally involved in the 1976-77 discussions, and thereafter
was involved with the MFCMA research exclusion in the Department of State and National Marine Fisheries Service.

bly very low and basically inconsequential. Most legitimate scientists
want to avoid interference with valuable ship time due to a misunderstanding with enforcement officers about their activities. Additionally, researchers generally are very keen to solicit cooperation
from local scientists, as the benefits to them of obtaining local
knowledge of stocks and environmental conditions are substantial.
If an enforcement officer of the United States encounters a foreign
vessel which is taking fish and claims to be conducting fisheries research, and there has been no prior review by the NMFS, every effort will be made to verify the bona fides of the research with
NMFS scientists. If the officer has probable cause to believe that the
vessel is actually "fishing" within the meaning of the MFCMA, he
may board it for further checking. If the vessel is engaged in commercial fishing, further appropriate enforcement action will be taken.
If the activity is legitimate research, the researcher will be only temporarily distracted from his scientific investigations. In unusual cases
a court may have to determine whether the activity under investigation was research or not. Of course, an authentic researcher would
be anxious to comply with proper procedures so that he could resume
his business with a minimum delay.
The 1976-77 discussions between federal agencies and MSR academics resulted in a series of policy guidelines, under which the use
of commercial fishing gear or the taking of commercial quantities of
fish is to be considered "fishing" under the MFCMA, except if done
pursuant to fisheries research, in full cooperation with the United
States. Subsequently, regulations were implemented under the
MFCMA whereby "scientific research" may include "certain fishing
activities," if carried out in full cooperation with the United States.""
These guidelines are viewed by some as a limitation upon the
MFCMA scientific exclusion, implemented to facilitate a clear distinction between "fishing" and "research" for enforcement purposes.
The guidelines appear to encourage compliance with the prior review
procedure, rather than serve as a definitive restriction on all fisheries
research which involves the use of commercial gear or hauls. As a
practical matter, the review procedure has become standard. The researcher who would venture to use commercial gear without a permit
or without entering into some type of a cooperative arrangement
would be adventuresome indeed. He faces the risk of being considered a commercial fisherman, and thus subject to enforcement action, potentially including the seizure of his vessel. Most marine
scientists would rather not participate in this kind of adventure.
There have been very few cases where an individual has claimed
he was going to conduct "research" when he was clearly attempting
16. See 50 C.F.R. § 611.17(a) (1982).
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to fish commercially. Although there are no hard and fast rules to
distinguish research from fishing, in reality the distinction is fairly
obvious to the scientists and experienced enforcement officers. Moreover, it has been relatively easy to dissuade potential violators from
pursuing illegal commercial fishing.
In summary, although fisheries research occasionally involves the
taking of commercial quantities of fish, national interests in the EEZ
of the United States have not been harmed by the policy of declining
to assert jurisdiction over foreign research otherwise authorized
under international law. Overall scientific interests and the conservative approach to the implementation of customary international law
have benefitted from this policy. Informal certification procedures, in
the vast majority of cases, ensure that enforcement officers are on
notice that foreign fisheries research is legitimate and not a guise for
illegal fishing inside the EEZ of the United States.

